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POINT I 
THIS CASE DOES INVOLVE A LIBERTY INTEREST THAT PERMITS THIS 
COURT TO REVIEW APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME 
In its reply, the State misapprehends the thrust of Petersen's liberty interest 
argument. The State contends that Petersen's property claim is not a liberty interest. See 
page 13 of Reply Brief. To support this proposition, the State cites Straley v. Galetka, 
2000 UT App. 348, an unpublished opinion. This Court should attach little or no weight 
2 
to this case, as the Utah Supreme Court is weary of unpublished opinions, noting that 
unpublished opinions may "lead to Trial Court rulings not consistent with our case law." 
See Paffel v. Paffel 732 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman J. concurring). Indeed, 
Justice Zimmerman, after noting the numerous problems inherent with unpublished 
decisions, argued that "it is time we stopped the practice of unpublished opinions." Id. 
Because the State's argument is void of any solid legal support, the State resorts to 
citing an unpublished opinion to bolster its contention that "this case in no way involves 
a deprivation of a liberty interest." See Page 13 of Reply Brief. If the State had a 
forceful legal argument, it would not need to resort to an unpublished opinion. Indeed, 
the Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734 (Utah 2002), case relied on in the State's Reply 
Brief supports this proposition. In Rogers, the Utah Supreme Court stated that parties 
with solid legal arguments need not rely on unpublished opinions-noting that parties with 
strong legal claims could (and should) resort to published reporters filled with 
authoritative statements to support their propositions. Rogers, 44 P.3d at 736 
("Memorandum decisions are intended to address cases which do not present novel 
issues of law on appeal, with reference to well-established precedent arising either from 
case law or from unambiguous statutory language. They are intended to be of use only to 
the lower tribunal whose work is the subject of the appeal, and to the litigants and parties 
in the case").1 
i 
Not only is the Straley opinion of no value to this court, but the State takes the statement 
3 
Instead of perusing unpublished opinions to decide the merits of this case, this 
Court should approach the question of whether or not to allow Petersen's argument to be 
heard for the first time on appeal with two holdings from the Utah Supreme Court in 
mind. 
First, the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly found that forfeiture cases, similar to 
Petersen's, are often disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. See e^ g. State v. Real 
Property at 633 East 640 North. Orem. Utah. 994 P.2d 1254 (Utah 2000). As such, the 
Utah Supreme Court has expressed a preference for hearing cases, like the one sub 
judice, on their merits. Id. 
Second, the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly expressed a preference for cases to 
be tried on their merits, and have urged Utah courts to be indulgent in setting default 
judgments aside. See Heath v. Mower. 597 P.2d 855, 858 (Utah 1979); See also 
McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates. Inc.. 411 P.2d 129, 130 (Utah 1966). This 
principle is of particular importance where a default judgment was obtained pursuant to a 
statute that the Utah Supreme Court has found disfavor with. See e,g. Real Property at 
633 East. 994 P.2d at 1254. 
As this Court is well aware, Petersen's home was forfeited, via default judgment 
made by the Stralev court out of context. The court in Straley. held that the defendant's 
contention that his punitive isolation violated due process did not give rise to protection 
under the due process clause on its own force-noting that this type of action by the State 
was an "ordinary incident of prison life." Stralev. 2000 UT App 348. In the case sub 
judice, forfeiting an individuals home without proper notice pursuant to a contraversial 
statute is not an ordinary incident of the legal process. 
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and pursuant to the forfeiture statute that the Utah Supreme Court has expressed disdain 
for. These two important principles should be at the forefront of the Court's mind when 
considering the liberty argument that Petersen relies upon. 
As detailed in Petersen's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Second Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (R. 119-143), Utah Courts will consider 
constitutional questions raised for the first time on appeal when a defendant's liberty is at 
stake. See e^. State v. Breckenbridge. 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983). The United 
States Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the forfeiture of an individual's property 
is a liberty interest that the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution seeks to 
protect: 
"Thus, as assurance against ancient evils, our country, 
in order to preserve 'the blessings of liberty,' wrote 
into its basic law the requirement, among other, that 
the forfeiture of the lives, liberties or property of 
people accused of crime can only follow if procedural 
safeguards of due process have been obeyed." 
Gallegos v. Colorado. 370 U.S. 49, 51 (1962) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 
236, 237 (1940)) (Emphasis added). 
As the Gallegos court makes abundantly clear, property, along with the forfeiture 
of a life, is a 'blessing of liberty' that the constitution seeks to preserve. Such a 
fundamental blessing should not be disregarded, especially when the property has been 
forfeited pursuant to a statute that the Utah Supreme Court has found to be flawed. See 
&g. Real Property at 633 East, 994 P.2d at 1254. 
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Given the problems that the Utah Supreme Court has had with the forfeiture 
statute, coupled with the concomitant disfavor of default judgments, this Court should 
entertain Petersen's liberty interest argument on appeal for the first time. Indeed, the 
United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that property, along with the forfeiture 
of life, is a liberty interest that the Constitution seeks to protect. See Gallegos, 370 U.S. 
at51. 
POINT II 
THIS CASE DOES INVOLVE AN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE SO 
AS TO ALLOW THIS COURT TO CONSIDER PETERSEN'S CLAIM 
The State erroneously argues that it would not have been futile for Petersen to 
argue the service of the Complaint simultaneously with the Notice of Seizure and 
Intended Forfeiture. Contrary to the State's assertion, that the Ohms holding simply 
stands for the proposition that if raising an argument at the trial court level "would likely 
prove futile," a court of appeal can review the argument if raised for the first time on 
appeal (see Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 848 (Utah 1994)) and because the 
case subjudice is not factually on all fours with the Ohms case then the legal proposition 
in Ohms has no application. This Court should reject such reasoning and consider 
Petersen's argument on appeal as it would have clearly proved futile to do so at the trial 
level. 
The State's argument ignores the pragmatic reality that it would have been of no 
use for Petersen to argue that the service of the complaint was insufficient until the Court 
6 
determined the sufficiency of service of the Notice of Seizure and Intended Forfeiture. 
Moreover, Petersen anticipated that the trial court would rule on the sufficiency of 
service of the Complaint since it, along with the Notice of Seizure were served together. 
The fact the Court failed to address the sufficiency of service of the Complaint created 
the situation where this issue was now ripe for consideration. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY PETERSEN'S 
MOTION TO PROPERLY SET ASIDE PETERSEN'S SECOND 
MOTION WAS PLAIN ERROR 
As detailed in Petersen's Memorandum in Support of Second Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment, the trial court's decision to deny Petersen's Second Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment was plain error. Petersen will not reiterate the legal propositions 
set forth in that memorandum, as it is clear from that memorandum that Petersen has a 
meritorious defense in so far as the issue of sufficiency of service of process is 
jurisdictional and a judgment obtained without jurisdiction is void. 
Petersen would like to point out however that the State's assertion that Black's 
Title Inc. v. Utah State Insurance Dep't 991 P.2d 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) requires this 
Court to affirm the trial court's default judgment is erroneous for the following reasons: 
First, Black's Title involved the revocation of an insurance license-not a 
home. The revocation of an individual's insurance license is not comparable to 
having one's home seized. Furthermore, an insurance license is not an interest 
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that the United States Supreme Court has explicitly characterized as a blessing of 
liberty that needs to be preserved. See Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 51. 
Second, in Black's Title, the defendant retained an attorney before the 
•proceedings were initiated against him. In the case subjudice, Petersen had no 
attorney until after default judgment was entered against him. Furthermore, the 
Black's Title opinion indicates that "The Department [initiating the complaint] 
also mailed copies to Diumenti [defendant's attorney] and to both Black and Kathi 
[defendant's wife] at their residential address on file with the Department." Id. at 
610. In the case subjudice, Petersen's counsel never received such notice, nor did 
Petersen for that matter. Indeed, Petersen was in jail at the time that notice was 
mailed. To assert that the defendant's circumstances in Black's Title are similar to 
Petersen is erroneous. 
Third, the court in Black's Title found that the defendant "had knowledge 
that the Department had begun an investigation and that Kathi [defendant's wife] 
had retained Diumenti [defendant's attorney], but that [defendant] took no 
action." Id. Once again, in the case subjudice, had the petitioner known that the 
State was taking action, the petitioner would have vigorously opposed the process 
however, the petitioner was not a free member of society, did not have counsel 
and he had no opportunity to take action. 
Ironically, the Black's Title opinion actually gives credence to and supports that 
8 
the default judgment should be set aside. The court explicitly stated that default 
judgment's should be set aside where "there is a reasonable justification or excuse for 
failure to answer." Id. (quoting Miller v. Martineau & Co., 983 P.2d 1107, 1112 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1999)). In Black's Title, the defendant had no reasonable excuse, as he was on 
notice, he had counsel, and he was not incarcerated. In the case subjudice, Petersen was 
incarcerated, did not have counsel, and was not on notice. Such circumstances are a 
reasonable excuse, and this Court should set aside the default judgment. 
The factual differences in Black's Title clearly renders the case distinguishable 
and inapplicable. Furthermore, as discussed above, this Court should find that Petersen 
did have a reasonable excuse for not responding to the notice, and should set aside the 
default judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in Appellant's Brief, Reply Brief and Petersen's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Second Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment, this Court should overturn the trial court's denial of Petersen's 
Second Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and allow this matter to be heard on it's 
merits. 
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